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Abstract
Where do emergent features come from? This has long
been an intriging puzzle. The concept of pet fish illus-
trates the difficulty. Most people expect pet fish to live
in bowls, even though this is not something either pets
or fish normally do. The inference that pet fish have the
feature of living in bowls cannot be explained purely in
terms of the constituents themselves. The feature seems
to emerge. The present paper aims to explain this effect
using notions of classificatory composition. Adjoined
concept references are taken to construct classifications
rather than combinations; a pet fish is taken to be a
fish classified as a pet rather than a combination of a
pet a fish. It is also shown that, where concepts have a
compositional representation, feature emergence can be
accounted for in terms of compositional accommodation.
Introduction
The concept of pet fish is one of the best known examples
of a conceptual combination that produces difficult to
explain ‘emergent features.’ People expect pet fish to
live in bowls, even though this is not expected of either
pets or fish (Murphy, 1988). The feature lives-in-bowls
somehow leaps into existence when the concepts pet and
fish are combined. But how and why? The effect seems
to be something to do with the way the combination is
explained. But giving a precise and general account is
not straightforward (Rosch, 2011). This is the so-called
Pet Fish problem, also known as the Guppy problem
(Osherson and Smith, 1981)
Simple cases of concept combination are dealt with rel-
atively easily. Let’s say we combine the concept brown
with the concept cow to form the concept, brown cow.
Linguistically, the effect is to apply an adjective to a
noun. In conceptual terms, the process is said to involve
attachment of a modifier concept (brown) to a head con-
cept (cow). Various explanations can then be set out.
Assuming a schematic, slot/filler type of representation,
the effect can be seen as one in which the modifier con-
cept brown becomes the new filler for the color slot in
the cow representation (cf. Hampton, 2011).
Simple explanations of this sort run into problems
quite quickly, however. One relates to typicality effects.
Consider the concept of a road bridge. For residents of
the UK, a highly typical case of a road bridge is the
Forth Road Bridge in Scotland. Unfortunately, this en-
tity is unlikely to be considered typical of either roads or
bridges, on which basis there is a mystery about how the
combination acquires typicality attributions not given to
either constituent. This is known as the conjunction ef-
fect (Smith and Osherson, 1984).
Schematic theories of representation (Rumelhart and
Ortony, 1977; Rumelhart, 1980) seem to offer a way of
dealing with such problems. Let’s say an apple concept
is represented by a schema with slots for color and size.
The fact that apples are typically green may be cap-
tured by placing a high typicality value on green as a
color value (Murphy, 2002, p. 447). If constructing the
concept of a red apple has the effect of placing red into
the color slot of the apple schema, while also giving it a
high typicality value, the expected typicality effect is re-
produced. A red apple is then modeled as more typical
of the concept red apple than it is of the concept red,
or the concept apple. This approach to typicality values
is at the heart of the selective modification proposal of
Smith and Osherson (1984; Smith et al., 1988).1
The immediate difficulty with this idea is that it de-
pends on there being a suitably modifiable slot in the
head schema (Machery, 2009). In many cases, this seems
to be ruled out. Consider Murphy’s example of a ‘party
dog’. A plausible idea is that a party dog is a dog that
does tricks. It is much less plausible that a dog schema
will have a does-tricks slot, however. Combinations in
which the head concept seems to lack any usefully mod-
ifiable slot abound. As Murphy notes, it is simply ‘not
the case that an adjective can automatically pick out a
single dimension to modify’ (Murphy, 2002, p. 450).
The general difficulty is the way in which concept com-
bination goes beyond what can plausibly be conjured
from constituent representations. The concept of pet
fish is the classic illustration but ‘Harvard-educated car-
penter’ is also revealing. People described as instances
of this concept are likely to be seen as non-materialistic
(Kunda et al., 1990). This seems to involve reasoning
with relations that have nothing to do with the con-
stituent concepts. Kunda et al., describe the process as
the development of a ‘causal narrative.’ A simpler ex-
1In fact, the selective modification model involves modi-
fication of both typicality ‘votes’ and dimension diagnostici-
ties, the latter being required to explain reverse conjunction
effects.
ample is ‘big dog’. This entity seems to have features
that cannot be explained in terms of representations for
the concept big and the concept dog. A big dog is pre-
sumably small in relation to a house, for example. Any
theory that models the combinational process purely in
terms of constituent representations cannot explain such
effects.
Explaining how concept-combination goes beyond pro-
cessing of constituent representations is thus a key part
of most proposals. In the concept specialization model
of (Cohen and Murphy, 1984; Murphy, 1988) the process
is understood to involve placing a representation of the
modifier concept into a slot selected on the basis of back-
ground knowledge. This is then interpreted and elab-
orated taking ‘outside knowledge’ into account (Mur-
phy, 1988, p. 533).2 The model allows scope for emer-
gence of features through explanation. It has also been
extended by Wisniewski to incorporate mechanisms of
property-mapping, concept hybridization and relation-
linking (Wisniewski, 1997; Wisniewski and Love, 1998).
Other proposals envisage ways in which processes of
reasoning might directly mediate the combinational pro-
cess. In Thagard’s Amalgam theory (Thagard, 1984)
application of procedural rules regulates slot/value se-
lection in ways that promote an interpretation that rec-
onciles ‘the conflicting expectations contained in the can-
didate concepts’ (Thagard, 1984, p. 4). Hampton’s com-
posite prototype model (Hampton, 1987, 1988, 1991)
also deems combination to involve processes of reason-
ing, although here the process is based on theory-driven
relations connecting slots of the original representations.
Another proposal is the CARIN model of Gagne and
Shoben (1997; Gagne, 2000; Gagne and Shoben, 2002).
Here, the key idea is that combinational processes access
a small library of fundamental thematic relations, includ-
ing Cause, Has, About, Make, For, Use and Located-at.
The model envisages combination to involve construct-
ing an integrated slot/filler representation based around
one or more of these foundational relations.
A variety of combinatorial mechanisms are proposed in
the literature, then. Each has its pros and cons from the
explanatory point of view (Ran and Duimerang, 2009;
Murphy, 2002). The present paper aims to add a new
explanatory proposal but does not hypothesise any new
form of combinatorial mechanism. Rather it aims to ex-
plain featural effects in terms of the compositional prop-
erties that concepts inherently possess. It aims to show
the sense in which feature emergence is a natural out-
come of conceptual compositionality.
The hypothesis, more specifically, is that feature emer-
gence can be explained in terms of natural concept com-
2As Ran and Duimerang note, a problem with this is
that the nature of outside knowledge is ‘not clearly defined
and is treated as a kind of black box in which the cognitive
mechanisms that guide its function are unknown’ (Ran and
Duimerang, 2009, p. 57).
position. Conceptual structure assembled by this pro-
cess has the distinguishing feature of being held together
purely by the classificatory properties of concepts in
the structure. There is no superimposed, compositional
framework. The features which emerge from combin-
ing two concepts, it is argued, can be explained as the
constructs that grow out of extending a natural compo-
sitional structure to accommodate constituent represen-
tations. However, it is to emphasized that the examples
set out are intended to illustrate possible mechanisms.
They are not intended to be realistic models of cognitive
structure. The proposal is set out in two main sections.
The section immediately to follow introduces the idea of
natural concept composition. The second section shows
how this type of conceptual structure can be a way of
explaining cases of feature emergence.
Natural concept composition
Although the classificatory functions of concepts are
normally viewed as applying to non-conceptual entities,
they can also be seen as applying to concepts themselves.
A fork concept is the means of classifying something as a
fork. A plastic concept is the means of classifying some-
thing as plastic. But some forks are plastic, on which
basis the plastic concept can also be a way of classifying
the fork concept. What is picked out is the extensional
intersection—the set of all plastic forks. This is just the
extension of the concept of plastic forks. Where exten-
sions intersect in this way, the effect of using one concept
to cross-classify another can thus be a new concept: it is
the concept whose extension is the intersection arising.
Cross-classification of one concept by another has the
potential to yield an implied concept, with an extension
that is derived by intersection.
The more complex case of this is where we have a con-
cept that classifies an n-tuple of entities (i.e., a relation).
For example, let’s say we have a male-celebrity concept,
a female-celebrity concept and a married-couple concept.
There is the potential for a male and female celebrity to
be classified as a married couple. The married-couple
concept is a potential classification of an n-tuple com-
prising the male-celebrity and female-celebrity concepts,
then. The result is a celebrity-couple concept, whose ex-
tension is the set of couples made up of a male and a
female celebrity.
Classifications of this type exist whenever the exten-
sion of the classifying concept contains at least one of the
possible permutations of instances. To formalize this,
we have to work in terms of cartesian products. A cross-
classification exists if the extension of the classifying con-
cept intersects the cartesian product of the extensions of
constituents in the classified n-tuple.3 Provided we al-
low singleton n-tuples, this deals with all cases, since the
3The statement that two sets intersect is taken to mean
that they have a non-empty intersection.
cartesian product of a single set is just the set itself.
A general rule can be stated accordingly.
• Cross-classification rule: concept x classifies some
n-tuple of concepts (not including x) if the cartesian
product formed from their extensions intersects the
extension of x.
It is then possible to define the situation where a set
of concepts gives rise to an implied concept by means of
classificatory composition.
• Composition rule: if within some set of concepts there
is a valid cross-classification that gives rise to an
extension that is new for the set, this composition is
an implied concept.
The idea of ‘compositional completion’ can then be set
out. A set of concepts may be said to be compositionally
complete just in case it has no implied concepts. This
either means all of them have already been added, or
there were none to begin with. The compositional com-
pletion of a set of concepts is the set of implied concepts
given rise to, then. The composition rule specifically re-
quires that an extension be new for the original set of
concepts. This accommodates the possibility of having
two or more implied concepts with the same extension.
Notice the rules allow for cumulative effects: the iden-
tification of one implied concept can give rise to another.
The result in such cases is a compositional structure of
two levels—one classification inside another. There is
no limit on the number of times this can happen, and
thus no limit on the structural complexity that may
emerge. The compositional completion of a set of con-
cepts may comprise conceptual structures of arbitrary
compositional complexity. These structures have the
distinguishing feature of being held together purely by
the classificatory properties of the concepts they contain.
There is no superimposed, compositional formalism. For
this reason, the process is called natural concept compo-
sition.
Couples example
The dynamics of natural concept composition can be
illustrated by extending the celebrity-couples example.
Let’s say we start with a set of five concepts defined as
follows.
male-celebrity = {Brad, David, George}
female-celebrity = {Ange, Posh, Rita}
pets = {Fido, Twinkle, Rover}
couples = {〈Brad Ange〉, 〈David Posh〉, 〈Fido Qi〉}
pet-owners = {〈Brad Ange Fido〉, 〈Jo Sam Rover〉}
These definitions should be self-explanatory. The exten-
sion of the male-celebrity concept is defined to be {Brad,
David, George}. The extension of the couples concept
is {〈Brad Ange〉, 〈David Posh〉, 〈Fido Qi〉}, and so on.
All elements of extensions are understood to be n-tuples,
but where n = 1, the angle brackets are omitted.
Examination of the definitions reveals that initially
there is just one compositional implication. The exten-
sional cartesian product of male-celebrity and female-
celebrity intersects the extension of the couples con-
cept, with the intersection being {〈Brad Ange〉, 〈David
Posh〉}. The classification of 〈male-celebrity female-
celebrity〉 by the couples concept is an implication of
the set, then. For purpose of notating this, the conven-
tion used here is to enclose the classifying concept and
its constituents in square brackets, with the classifying
concept placed first. The implied construction is thus
written
[couples male-celebrity female-celebrity]
The concept is that of a celebrity couple: it is referred to
as the celebrity-couple concept below. The extensional
definition is {〈Brad Ange〉, 〈David Posh〉}.
Once this implied concept has been identified, there is
a knock-on effect resulting from the ability of the pet-
owners concept to classify a composite of celebrity-couple
and pets. The cartesian product derived from this in-
cludes 〈Brad Ange Fido〉, which is within the extension
of pet-owners. A second implied concept then exists, in
which the initial construction plays the role of a con-
stituent. This is a structure of two levels:
[pet-owners
[couples male-celebrity female-celebrity]
pets ]
The implied concept is that of a celebrity-couple classi-
fied as pet owners. In other words, it is the concept of
a pet-owning celebrity-couple. This is the final implica-
tion in the present case. The compositional completion
of this set comprises just two concepts, then.
Feature emergence
The second part of the proposal can now be set out. The
hypothesis is that feature emergence results from natu-
ral concept composition. Viewing concept combination
as classificatory composition has the effect of making fea-
ture emergence an expected outcome. Where a feature
is seen to emerge as a result of combining two concepts,
the process can be modeled in terms of compositional
conceptions brought into existence by activating compo-
sitional representations.
In the simplest cases, concept combination can be ex-
plained purely in terms of schematic representation, and
the ways in which activating one schema modifies an-
other. Such accounts are straightforwardly translated
into the present framework. From the compositional
point of view, a slot/filler schema is a construction in
which the classifying concept is that of combination, and
each constituent is a one-level construction in which a
filler value classifies a slot value. An apple schema has
something like the following form, then.
[combination [green color] [round shape]]
Any account in which concepts are deemed to be com-
bined by means of schema modification can then be ex-
pressed in terms of conceptual integration. Taking the
concept of red to have the form [red color], an integra-
tion of the apple and red concepts would produce this
conception of a red apple, for example.
[combination [red color] [round shape]]
This is the sense in which compositional processes can
model schema-updates.4 But notice the classificatory
viewpoint that is imposed. On the assumption of the
combination being represented compositionally, a red ap-
ple is an apple that is classified as red. It is not a red
thing that is also an apple.
Combinations of more relevance to the Pet Fish prob-
lem are ones which yield emergent features via inferential
explanation. The account in the case of ‘pet fish’ has al-
ready been noted: people expect pet fish to live in bowls
(even though this is not the usual behavior of either pets
or fish) because this is a way of explaining how fish can
be both kept, and kept alive (cf. Murphy, 1988). The
process is seen to involve the construction of an inferen-
tial explanation in which living in bowls is inferred to be
the only way of meeting the requirement for fish to be
kept in water.
The procedure for translating an explanatory pro-
cess into a compositional one involves treating each in-
ferential step as a conception. Inferences involving a
schematic idea are seen as combinatorial conceptions
(i.e., classifications based on the concept of combina-
tion). Inferences involving a categorical idea are seen
as unifying conceptions (i.e., classifications based on the
concept of unity). The process of connecting one in-
ference to another is conceptual construction. Such con-
nections are established by making one conception a con-
stituent of another.
The explanatory process prompted by ‘pet fish’ inte-
grates the schematic inference that fish need to live in
water with the schematic inference that pets are kept in
enclosures. Assume the construction of the pet concep-
tion is
[combination [habitat enclosure] [role amusement]],
4Most of the subtleties of schema-update proposals are
ignored, here. Conjunction and reverse-conjunction effects
(Smith et al., 1988) are potentially explained, however, as-
suming typicality attributions are increased by conceptual
specificity, and decreased by conceptual contradiction. This
has the effect of making red apples more typical, and brown
apples less typical of the red apple conception than either
apples or red things taken separately.
The corresponding conception of fish is
[combination [habitat water] [activity swimming]].
The two schematic inferences are then straightforwardly
accomplished—they result directly from activating the
constituent representations. Their integration, on the
other hand, requires a combining conception. Given the
understanding that a pet fish is a fish classified as a
pet, this must impose the habitat classification from the
pet conception on the habitat classification in the fish
conception. The construct obtained is then
[combination
[habitat [enclosure water]]
[role amusement]
[activity swimming]].
On the assumption that [habitat [enclosure water]] con-
structs a conception of a habitat containing water, some-
thing akin to the lives-in-bowls feature is reproduced.
combination
rolehabitat
pet
enclosure amusement
combination
activityhabitat
 sh
water swimming
combination
rolehabitat
pet  sh
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Figure 1: ‘Pet fish’.
This compositional story is set out schematically in
Figure 1. In this diagram, triangles represent concep-
tions: the name of the conception appears at the apex,
with the classifying concept placed above the lower edge,
and the classified constituents below it. Where we have
a classification with a single constituent, a stack arrange-
ment is used. The classifying conception is placed im-
mediately above the classified constituent, with a line
between them.
More complex cases of feature emergence give rise
to more complex interpretations. But the principles
of translation remain the same. Consider the case of
‘Harvard-educated carpenter’. The emergent feature in
this case relates to an attitude: Harvard-educated car-
penters are inferred to be ‘non-materialistic’ (Kunda et
al., 1990). The combination of high earning power and
modest remuneration in a single individual is taken to
imply that the individual must have a care-less attitude
to money. The feature that emerges is a known classifi-
cation of a combination of features. But these features
are inferred rather than given.
combination
Harvard-education
combination
non-materialism
earning-power
elevation
remuneration
limitation
earning-power
elevation. . . . . .
combination
carpenter
. . . . . .
remuneration
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Figure 2: ‘Harvard-educated carpenter’.
Modeled as natural concept composition, the explana-
tory process has the form depicted in Figure 2. The
inference that a Harvard education produces high earn-
ing power comes from activating the relevant composi-
tional representation (which incorporates the conception
[elevation earning-power]). The inference that a carpen-
ter is likely to have limited remuneration is produced in
a similar same way, by activating the relevant compo-
sitional conception. An attitude of non-materialism is
then inferred by means of an existing combinatorial con-
ception for non-materialism based on these particular
constituents. Again, the interpretation enforces a classi-
ficatory understanding. A Harvard-educated carpenter
is not taken to be a combination of a carpenter and a
Harvard education. It is seen to be the classification of
a carpenter as Harvard-educated.
More complex still is the idea of an apartment dog.
This phrase is found to suggest the idea of a dog that
is small, even though this is not normally a property of
either apartments or dogs (Murphy, 1988). The compli-
cation is the involvement of an intermediate idea. An
apartment dog is not seen to be a dog classified as an
apartment, let alone a dog that is also an apartment. It
is expected to be a dog that lives in an apartment. Part
of the explanatory process entails the idea of a particular
type of agent residing in a particular type of dwelling.
The inferential steps in the explanation are seen to
be essentially as follows (cf. Murphy, 2002). There is
the categorical inference that apartments are types of
dwelling, and the categorical inference that dogs and oc-
cupants are both types of agent. There are also three
schematic inferences: the inference that apartments of-
fer limited scope for exercise, the inference that dwellings
have residents that are suitable, and the inference that
suitability of an occupant for a dwelling requires corre-
spondence between the occupant’s size and exercise re-
quirement. The structure labeled A in Figure 3 shows
these five steps as compositional conceptions. The con-
cepts utilized for classification include that of combina-
tion, of unity, and of correspondence.
Given this model, the conclusion that apartment dogs
are small can be seen to result from an interaction be-
accomodation
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size
correspondence
occupant
exercise-scope
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dog
size
correspondence
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Figure 3: ‘Apartment dog’.
tween two conceptual processes. Reference to an apart-
ment activates a dwelling conception in which exercise-
scope is classified as restricted. A conception of residence
is then realized, incorporating a suitability conception
that classifies the size of the occupant as corresponding
to the (restricted) exercise-scope of the dwelling. The
only way of integrating the conception activated by the
dog reference is then by inferring the dog to be the oc-
cupant in the residence conception. There is then an
implicit classification (via the suitability conception) of
the size of the dog as corresponding to the exercise-scope
of the dwelling. A restriction is inferred to apply to the
size of the dog. Emergence of the infered feature of small-
ness is obtained by means of a sequence of interacting,
compositional constructions.
Modeling concept combination in this way has the ad-
vantage of parsimony. Notions of schematic representa-
tion and explanatory inference are collapsed to the idea
of compositional conceptualization. The approach can
deal with simple cases involving direct transfer of fea-
tures as well as more complex cases involving explana-
tion. But it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the
examples set out are not intended to be realistic models
of human cognition. It is not claimed that these partic-
ular conceptions are the ones people use. Given a free
choice of what concepts are given, and no restriction on
the number of constructive levels that can be brought
into play, there are infinitely many ways in which any
conception can be constructed. The examples set out
are purely illustrative of the way in which feature emer-
gence might result from classificatory composition.
Conclusion
Adjoined concept references are normally viewed as con-
structing combinations. The phrase ‘toy vehicle’ is con-
sidered to combine the concepts toy and vehicle, the
phrase ‘pet fish’ is considered to combine pet and fish,
and the phrase ‘apartment dog’ is considered to com-
bine apartment and dog. Hence the name of the area
of study. But as the present paper shows, these phrases
can also be seen as classifications. A ‘toy vehicle’ can
be a vehicle classified as a toy, a pet fish can be a fish
classified as a pet, and an apartment dog can be a dog
classified as living in an apartment. This leads to a new
way of explaining feature emergence. On the assumption
that concepts are represented as classificatory composi-
tions (rather than as one-leveled schemata), explanatory
feature emergence can be seen to grow out of composi-
tional conceptualization. This avoids the need to think
in terms of dedicated mechanisms of combination and
explanation. The phenomenon is seen to result from
activation of naturally constructed, compositional rep-
resentations.
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